























This paper analyzes seller choices and outcomes in approximately 700 recent 
Internet auctions. The ‘Buy it Now’ option allows the seller to convert the auction into a 
posted price market. We use a structural model to control for the (endogenous) conduct 
of the auction (e.g., number of bids and bidders) as well as product and seller 
characteristics. Among other things we find that the ‘Buy it Now’ option was used more 
often by sellers with higher ratings (awarded by previous buyers) and offering fewer 
units; and posted prices were more prevalent for used items. Sellers obtained higher 
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  11. Introduction 
  The Internet drastically alters absolute and relative transaction costs, and therefore 
will alter market institutions. The posted offer institution dominated retail markets in the 
20
th century, but now e-commerce is developing new auction institutions and hybrids that 
combine aspects of auction and posted price institutions. As e-commerce takes hold in the 
retail sector—by 2003 the rapidly growing e-commerce share of retail sales reached 
1.6%, about   $60 billion (US Census Bureau, 2004)—some patterns have begun to 
emerge. Amazon and other companies have created very efficient Internet versions of 
posted price institutions, and the evidence suggests that posted prices are more flexibly 
and finely adjusted in online settings (Smith et al., 2000). Meanwhile, Internet auctions, 
led by eBay, have grown out from their original garage sale niche; a substantial portion of 
eBay’s $15 billion 2003 gross revenue represents retail transactions (Hof, 2003). 
Auctions and posted prices seem destined to coexist online, and for overlapping sets of 
goods.  
What are the economic factors that determine the choice of market institution? In 
this paper we present empirical evidence from recent Internet auctions on eBay that 
include the option for buyers to purchase immediately at a pre-specified ‘Buy it Now’ 
price. As explained below, the option allows sellers to offer what is effectively a hybrid 
of auction and posted prices, or to choose pure versions of each institution. To untangle 
the causes and consequences of sellers’ choices, we estimate a structural model that 
predicts auction outcomes, controlling for the (endogenous) conduct of the auction (e.g., 
the number of bids and bidders), as well as characteristics that are predetermined, such as 
the characteristics of the seller, the good, and the transaction (e.g., payment options).   
  2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the 
most relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 identifies variables of interest 
and the causal structure of the empirical model.  Section 4 summarizes the data, obtained 
from over 700 eBay auctions, held during a period of five weeks, for a particular kind of 
hand-held computer. Section 5 presents results on seller characteristics and choices, while 
Section 6 presents results on the conduct and outcome of the Internet auctions studied, 
focusing particularly on the role of the ‘Buy it Now’ seller option as a hybrid posted price 
institution.  Section 7 concludes with a summary of results, a discussion of their 
implications, and suggestions for future research. An appendix provides some subsidiary 
details on the variables and the estimation results. 
 
 
2. Research on Market Institutions 
The theoretical literature comparing market institutions is quite diverse. One 
strand focuses on institutions such as market intermediaries that facilitate search and 
matching of buyers and sellers; e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987, 1990), Gale (1987) 
and Spulber (1996a,b): see Spulber (1999) for a synthesis. These papers typically assume 
a simple pricing rule, or assume that a non-cooperative or cooperative bargaining game 
determines the terms of the transaction.  Another strand focuses instead on the pricing 
strategy of sellers, or the detailed mechanics of the bargaining process, while having little 
to say on how buyers and sellers come together; e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), and 
Riley and Zeckhauser (1983). The large literature on auctions, surveyed in McAfee and 
McMillan (1987) and more recently in Klemperer (2002), can be regarded as a special 
case of the analysis of market institutions for price agreement.  
  3Comparisons across pricing institutions are less common. For example, Bulow 
and Klemperer (1996) provide a theoretical analysis of auctions versus some kinds of 
structured negotiations. Campbell and Levin (2002) also examine the issue of when or 
when not to use an auction format for selling. Reynolds and Wooders (2003) present a 
model in which the ‘Buy it Now’ auction hybrid formats offered by eBay and Yahoo are 
revenue equivalent to ascending bid auctions if bidders are risk neutral but can raise seller 
revenue in the presence of bidder risk aversion.  Budish and Takeyama (2001) arrive at 
the same conclusions independently.  However, we know of no theoretical literature that 
directly considers competing simultaneous (or overlapping) auctions held by numerous 
sellers, in the presence of an option to post prices. Existing theory does not present us 
with sharply posed testable hypothesis but, as noted below, it is often suggestive.  
  We see four relevant strands of empirical literature. The first involves laboratory 
experiments. Plott and Smith (1978) is the first laboratory comparison of market 
institutions: the oral double auction vs. the posted price institution. Holt (1995) covers 
some subsequent work. More recently, Cason, Friedman and Milam (2003) contrast the 
posted price institution with one featuring haggling to determine prices. The authors find 
that efficiency is lower, sellers’ price higher, and prices stickier under haggling than 
under posted offer pricing.   
A second strand features field data from financial markets, in the empirical 
market microstructure literature that begins with Garman (1976); see e.g., Stoll (2003) for 
a recent summary.  This literature focuses mainly on asset market efficiency, real-time 
price dynamics, and the role various sorts of market makers. Our focus is rather different.  
  A more recent empirical tradition, pioneered by Lucking-Reiley (1999), has been 
to conduct “field experiments” by purchasing goods (e.g., collectable trading cards) and 
  4reselling them on the Internet, using alternative market institutions. Lucking-Reiley thus 
tested classical results from auction theory, such as revenue equivalence. Resnick et al. 
(2003) report a field experiment more directly relevant to our concerns. They find that the 
effects of seller reputation, murky in most field data so far (including our own), have the 
predicted positive effect on seller revenues when proper experimental controls are 
imposed.  
Our work falls into a fourth strand, also quite recent. Researchers collect and 
analyze transactions data from large numbers of closely related Internet sites, typically 
auctions conducted on web sites operated by eBay, Yahoo or Amazon. This approach can 
be thought of as collecting involuntary survey data, or as an automated sampling 
technique. In one example, Houser and Wooders (2000) examine the effect of bidder and 
seller reputation on auction outcomes, concluding that seller reputations are correlated 
with auction success in Pentium III microprocessor auctions on eBay. Morgan and Baye 
(2001) analyze persistent price dispersion in posted price markets on the Internet.  The 
timing of bids, and the impact of different methods of specifying auction deadlines are 
studied by Roth and Ockenfels (2002). They propose that, given eBay’s auction format, 
late bidding may be rational for strategic agents. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) also provide 
a theoretical analysis of late bidding, and independently reach some of the same empirical 
conclusions as Roth and Ockenfels, using eBay data. They also examine issues of the 
winner’s curse and the impact of reserve prices. Ockenfels and Roth (2003) further 
examine the ending time issue, providing a theoretical analysis as well as a comparison of 
bidding behavior under different rules, using data from eBay and Amazon. Lucking-
Reiley et al. (2000) study price determination in eBay auctions of one-cent coins. We use 
the same data collection methods, described in Section 4 below.  
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3. Key Variables and Hypotheses 
The existing literature suggests a list of variables to be included in the empirical 
analysis, and, in some cases, provides specific hypotheses.  The appropriate dimensions 
for our analysis of the institutional structure of auctions are suggested by the literature.  
The variables can be put into several general categories, as follows: 
 
Product characteristics 
Hedonic theory (Lancaster, 1971; Rosen, 1974) distinguishes quality 
characteristics (for which all consumers have ordinally equivalent preferences) from 
niche characteristics (for which different consumer segments may have marginal 
valuations with opposite signs.) Quality increments ceteris paribus imply higher 
transaction prices.  
For our data, higher quality should be associated with “new” or “undamaged” 
products, and (due to rapid economic obsolescence) with earlier transaction dates. Niche 
characteristics, such as color or shipping location, are probably best dropped from the 
analysis because we have no demographic information on buyers. 
 
Seller characteristics 
The information regarding sellers that is available in an online auction is 
indirectly observed, and thus imperfect, and furthermore is often selected by the seller 
herself.  Information regarding seller characteristics, apart from that provided via the 
seller choices (discussed below), includes the feedback ratings provided by previous 
customers and the number of auctions the seller is currently running. The seller ratings 
  6may work in at least two dimensions, with a higher absolute number of ratings indicating 
a longer history in the auction site and the relative number of positive ratings more 
directly identifying seller quality.   
Although not directly the result of seller choices, the ratings are still imperfect 
signals of underlying characteristics, such as the trustworthiness of the seller to 
accurately represent the product and follow through in the transaction in good faith.   
Empirically, it is important to control for simultaneous seller choices as well.  For 
instance, a higher volume seller may appear more stable and professional, thus attracting 
more bidders and increasing transaction price, but sellers with many similar items to sell 
may utilize ‘Buy it Now’ pricing to price discriminate based on the relative patience or 
reservation prices of bidders, perhaps resulting in lower prices on average.  Theoretically, 
a more trustworthy seller will obtain higher prices in a separating equilibrium ceteris 
paribus (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).   
 
Seller choices: General 
Investments that signal trustworthiness, once sunk, presumably will increase 
transaction price, since otherwise the seller would have little reason to make them: these 
investments are therefore part of a separating equilibrium where the seller’s 
characteristics are unknown, ex ante. Such investments might possibly include use of 
photographs of the item, more detailed descriptions, buying a “featured” billing, or links 
to websites with further information regarding the seller.  A higher public reservation 
price could serve a similar purpose in signaling product quality. The seller’s choice of 
quantity to put up in a single auction would have no effect on price (other than possibly 
signaling trustworthiness) in a thick market. In a thin market it would tend to reduce the 
  7average transaction price. If buyers are price takers, a higher hidden reservation price will 
trade off a lower probability of a sale against a higher transaction price conditional on a 
sale. If buyers react to a hidden reservation price per se, there could be other effects.
1   
 
Seller Choices: Buy it Now and Posted Offer  
We examine this seller choice separately since it is a focus of the analysis. It 
should be noted that the seller can exactly replicate a posted offer by offering a ‘Buy it 
Now’ price and an equal public reserve price. Other forms of ‘Buy it Now’ approximate 
posted prices to a greater or lesser degree. 
The choice of posted price vs. straight auction mainly involves a trade-off 
between (a) expected losses due to mis-pricing a posted price, against (b) reduced 
demand due to buyers’ higher participation costs in auctions. The higher participation 
costs arise from the loss of immediacy—buyers must wait until the end of an auction to 
know whether they transacted—and flexibility—they should stand ready to make last 
second bids, or else have specialized software. Hence sellers who have relatively precise 
beliefs about demand will tend to prefer posted price or “Buy it Now”. If some sellers use 
a posted price and other sellers use straight auctions, then in a separating equilibrium, the 
buyers who are more risk averse and/or impatient will go for the ‘Buy it Now’ price and 
                                                 
1In a field experiment, Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000), comparing public and private reserve prices, 
found that the use of a private reserve reduces both the probability of a sale and the transaction price.  One 
caveat to these results is that the authors found some informal evidence that sellers were using the private 
reserve to circumvent eBay's fee structure by personally contacting high bidders after unsuccessful 
auctions.  Anderson et al. (2004), in a companion paper to the current piece, found that the probability of a 
sale was lower, but the transaction price higher, when a private reserve price was used. 
 
  8the other buyers will participate in the full auction.  This would be an interior 
equilibrium. On the other hand, sufficiently strong network externalities point to a corner 
equilibrium. Buyers prefer to go to a market format where there are many sellers, and 
sellers prefer to offer a format that attracts many buyers. 
 
Market history 
As the auction unfolds, further information may be revealed. For example the 
number of realized bids within a given time period may be a proxy for the number of 
potential bidders.   
 
  Figure 1 schematically shows the sequence of decisions that we will analyze. 
 
























We take the product and seller characteristics as exogenous, determining the seller 
choices on auction structure. These choices, together with exogenous buyer preferences, 
determine the dynamic course of the auction (or hybrid market when the ‘Buy it Now’ 
option is used) and the ultimate outcomes.  
Our strategy for analyzing the data accordingly has two parts.  First, we use the 
observable product and seller characteristics to explain the main seller choices, using 
  9Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for continuous choices and Logit for binary choices.   
Section 5 presents those results, and notes when they support or cast doubt on the testable 
hypotheses presented above.  Next, we use relevant exogenous characteristics, as well as 
instruments for the endogenous seller choices, to explain the market outcomes, via Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS).  Section 6 presents the results for this aspect of the auction. 
 
 
4. Data Overview 
Our hypotheses are best tested on a reasonably large sample of auctions for 
selling a homogeneous good over a short period of time.  Therefore we gathered data 
from eBay, the largest Internet auction site, for one of the highest volume (at the time) 
and most homogenous items, the Palm Vx handheld computer.   
 
eBay Auction Rules 
A review of eBay’s basic rules is in order before presenting the data. The seller 
provides information on the item, such as a description and picture, terms of payment and 
shipping, and chooses the duration of the auction, either 3, 5, 7, or 10 days. The seller 
also chooses a minimum first bid (starting price), and whether to enter a private reserve 
price. (Potential buyers know when a private reserve price exists but don’t know its value 
until someone bids above it.) Sellers may also provide links to their own “home pages” 
on the web, which can be a source of further information for buyers. 
Potential buyers can bid on any item they find on eBay’s web site, and bid 
histories are available to them. The auction ends at the pre-specified time, and the item 
goes to the highest bidder at the highest bid price. Shipping and payment are left up to the 
buyer and seller, although eBay services here are available at an additional fee. Finally, 
  10eBay also provides a record of comments about sellers, so that sellers possibly can build 
and maintain reputations. Potential buyers have access to these comments, as well as all 
seller-provided information.  
The seller also can specify a ‘Buy it Now’ price. By so doing, the seller commits 
to sell the item immediately to any buyer who accepts that price, thus ending the auction 
early.  The ‘Buy it Now’ option is extinguished (and disappears from the item’s auction 
site) when any buyer enters a bid that is at least as great as the minimum first bid, even if 
the first bid is lower than the ‘Buy it Now’ price. The seller can prevent this by 
specifying a starting price (or a private reserve price) at or above the ‘Buy it Now’ price.  
As noted earlier, such price combinations are equivalent to a posted price. (By 
using a high private reserve price to “protect” the ‘Buy it Now’ option, the seller allows 
bidding to continue but fruitlessly.
2 Buyer comments suggest that they find the practice 
annoying and they may avoid the auction. Using a high starting price is just as effective 
and more transparent.)  Used by itself, the ‘Buy it Now’ option creates a hybrid 
institution, a mix of an auction and a posted price, with buyer behavior determining 
which of the two institutions is activated for the transaction. 
 
The Data 
We collected data on 1211 Palm Vx auctions on eBay from August 6 to 
September 11, 2001 using a web-crawling “spider” similar to that described in Lucking-
Reiley et al (2000). In 24 cases, we could not determine whether or not the auction 
started with a ‘Buy it Now’ option, and these auctions were eliminated.  Of the remaining 
                                                 
2 Since this sample was collected, eBay has begun allowing sellers to offer goods exclusively at a ‘Buy it 
Now’ price, explicitly converting the offering to a posted offer. 
  111177 auctions, 1008 were successfully completed, ending in a sale. In this paper, we 
focus on completed auctions. A companion paper (Anderson et al., 2004) includes an 
analysis of the differences between auctions that resulted in a sale and those that did not.  
The main conclusions are that auctions involving a private reserve price were much less 
likely to end in a sale and that more experienced sellers in our sample very rarely failed 
to sell an item.  Additionally, we found that a sale was somewhat more likely when 
sellers made ‘Buy it Now’ offers. 
Furthermore, of the 1008 completed auctions, 286 were conducted by two high 
volume sellers, whom we term “retailers.” We omit these auctions from our sample as 
well, leaving 722 observations for analysis. We analyze the retailers separately, in 
Anderson et al. (2004), because their behavior differs importantly from the low volume 
sellers. In brief, the retailers had higher ratings, and they always used the pure ‘Buy it 
Now’ option. Both retailers used minimal ($0.01) “first bids” (starting prices) and 
avoided private reserve prices. Thus the retailers in our sample took full advantage of the 
hybrid, ‘Buy it Now’ institution by using it to provide a quick sale to impatient buyers, 
yet encouraging as much bidding up of the price as possible if no impatient buyer 
happened to be shopping at the time.  
Table 1 presents the average values of the variables. The first column reports on 
the full sample of completed transactions, the second and third report the sub-samples for 
which the seller did not or did use the ‘Buy it Now’ option, and the last two divide the 
previous sub-sample according to whether the ‘Buy it Now’ option was exercised. The 
sample sizes in appear in the bottom row. Complete definitions of variables appear in the 
Appendix. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
  12The observable product characteristics—whether the item is new, whether it is 
damaged or includes any extra accessories—are dummy variables.
3 Here quantity refers 
to the number of units offered in a particular auction; the mode is always 1, and large 
quantities are quite rare when ‘Buy it Now’ was offered. Days806 is the time trend; 
auctions starting later tend to yield lower prices due to economic obsolescence. The 
entries hint that ‘Buy it Now’ option is less likely to be offered but more likely to be 
accepted on new items, which constitute 28.3% of the sample. 
The observable seller characteristics unfortunately do not include risk aversion or 
time preference, but they do include the number of auctions conducted during the sample 
period (MULTSLR codes 2-10 auctions and FREQSLR codes 11-50) and buyer ratings. 
Ratings are long strings of comments, which we summarize in two variables: 
NEGRATIO (the ratio of negative to total comments), and LNSLRTNG (natural log of 
positive comments net of negative comments). Thus lower NEGRATIO and higher 
LNSLRTNG indicate two aspects of better seller reputation. These ratings are better on 
average in the ‘Buy it Now’ sub-samples. 
 Seller choices are summarized in the next section of the table. Overall, 12.9% of 
the auctions display links to homepages. Minimum bid prices average about $80, but 
diverge for accepted and not accepted “Buy it Now”, probably reflecting the fact that it 
option is accepted more often when it is effectively a posted price (POSTDPRC=1). 
Private reserve prices are used in 25.5% of all auctions, and more frequently when a ‘Buy 
it Now’ price is accepted. Sellers offer secure payment procedures (SCPYDUM=1) and a 
picture of the product (IMAGE=1) in about 70% of auctions, but rarely pay for a place in 
                                                 
3 Where there was any ambiguity, we consistently assumed that the characteristic (newness, damage, or 
inclusion of accessories) was not present. 
  13eBay’s featured items (FEATURED=1). Description lengths average about 4,000 
characters but are, for no obvious reason, slightly longer in auctions where the option is 
not accepted. Some 29.4% of auctions in our sample offer the ‘Buy it Now’ option; of 
these 42.5% actually are posted price. However, of those where “Buy it Now” was 
accepted, 97.9% are posted price.   
The last part of the table contains the auction outcomes, including average 
duration (about 5 days except when the ‘Buy it Now’ option is accepted), the number of 
bids, number of unique bidders, and the winning bid. Winning bids averaged $199, and 
tended to be about $3.50 higher for sellers offering the ‘Buy it Now’ option, whether or 
not it was accepted. 
As noted earlier, our regressions are for a set of 722 auctions, excluding two very 
high-volume sellers. We also separately analyze sub-samples: auctions where the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option was not used (510), those where it was (212), ‘Buy it Now’ auctions in 
which there was an auction and the ‘Buy it Now’ price was not the transaction price 
(121), and ‘Buy it Now’ auctions which ended through the use of the option, so that 
effectively no auction took place.  It is important to keep in mind that all but one of these 
91 auctions in this final sub-sample were auctions where the seller effectively used ‘Buy 
it Now’ to post a price.  Thus, the ‘Buy it Now’ option was accepted, but the only bidding 
alternative for the buyer was to try a different seller.  For the remaining 121 auctions that 
started with ‘Buy it Now,’ only one also had a posted price.
4   
                                                 
4 The explanations for why someone might bid higher than a posted price may be that they did not 
understand it to be a posted price, given the hybrid nature with a buy now offer or the buyer(s) may want to 
signal the seller that if the auction is unsuccessful they would be willing to purchase the item at a post-
auction discounted price.  The one observation where the final price was not equal to the posted price may 
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5. Seller Characteristics and Choices 
Tables 2 and 3 present OLS and Logit regression results for seller choices, using 
722 observations of auction sales by non-retailers.  The explanatory variables are the 
exogenous product and seller characteristics, omitting the dummy variable for FREQSLR 
(21-50 auctions).  The first column shows that the starting bid (or minimum price) is 
higher (on the order of $50-60) for the infrequent sellers and slightly higher for sellers 
with better reputations. The other variables (time trend DAYS806, dummies for new, 
damaged, extras, etc.) generally enter with the expected sign but are insignificant.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Column 2 indicates that frequent sellers and sellers with home pages tended to 
have longer product descriptions. NEGRATIO and LNSLRTNG coefficients are both 
positive, indicating an ambiguous effect of seller reputation on description length. The 
third column of Table 2 only encompasses the complementary sub-sample, the 212 
auctions that had the ‘Buy it Now’ option.  As one would expect, items that are 
characterized as ‘new’ have higher ‘Buy it Now’ prices, while items identified as 
damaged have lower ‘Buy it Now’ prices.  Auctions involving higher quantities have 
lower ‘Buy it Now’ prices, while sellers with a high ratio of negative comments set lower 
‘Buy it Now’ prices. Infrequent sellers tend to set higher ‘Buy it Now’ prices. 





simply be due to the seller completing this type of “side agreement” before the termination of the auction 
and letting it become the officially posted, final price. 
  15The first column of Table 3 confirms that the ‘Buy it Now’ option is chosen more 
often by sellers with better reputations.  Auctions with larger quantities are also less 
likely to use the ‘Buy it Now’ option.  New items are more likely to be sold with the ‘Buy 
it Now’ option, though the significance level is marginal.  Column 2 includes results for 
the dummy variable that represents the discrete seller choice of whether or not to start the 
bidding at an initial price above or below $50.  The results for the impacts of seller 
characteristics on this decision are similar to those for the continuous choice of a starting 
price level presented in the first column of Table 2, except that the ratio of negative 
comments appears to have a significant, negative impact on this discrete choice, while it 
was the overall seller rating that had a positive impact on the continuous choice of the 
starting price. 
Column 3 of Table 3 indicates that a private reserve price was used less often for 
new items and was used less often by infrequent sellers.  Column 4 indicates that the 
seller’s decision to incorporate a secure payment method (credit card, PayPal, eBay 
Online Payments, etc.) was more likely if the item was new, if the seller had a better 
rating, and if the seller had a home page. This choice was less likely for sellers who had 
just a single auction in the sample, and also if more than one item was being offered in 
the auction. Column 5 shows that items described as damaged were more likely to have a 
photo, perhaps to reassure potential buyers. Frequent sellers were more likely to use 
photographs, as were sellers with home pages. Higher rated sellers were more likely to 
use photographs. 
Columns 6-8 present the results of a multinomial Logit regression for the choice 
of auction length. Since auctions with the ‘Buy it Now’ option end at an endogenously 
determined time, these were excluded. The results are presented relative to the category 
  16of an auction length of three days (the minimum in the absence of “Buy it Now”). If the 
item was new, the chosen length of the auction tended to be shorter than 10 days. The 
presence of extra accessories tended to make the auction length of 7 days more popular. 
Sellers who conducted only one auction in the sample period tended to choose auctions 
longer than 3 days. The two seller quality variables had conflicting impacts on the 
auction length.  
The last column of Table 3 reflects only the 212 auctions that involved the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option, just like the last column in Table 2. This last column shows that the choice 
to create a posted price (usually by entering a starting price equal to the ‘Buy it Now’ 
price) is less likely for new items and more likely for experienced sellers (as indicated by 
LNSLRTNG).  
Table 4 reports actual and predicted outcomes for the multinomial Logit 
regression. The fit is quite good, in terms of matching between actual and predicted 
lengths, except for the 5-day auctions.  




6. Auction Outcomes 
We now examine how observed seller characteristics and seller choices influence 
auction outcomes. We are particularly interested in how the ‘Buy it Now’ option affects 
final price, i.e., the winning bid. For example, if the ‘Buy it Now’ option were used by 
mainly by impatient sellers, then we would see ‘Buy it Now’ auctions bringing lower 
average prices.  On the other hand, impatient buyers may be the ones attracted to the 
‘Buy it Now’ option, which implies a countervailing effect. While we cannot directly 
control for impatience, we can include a dummy variable for auctions beginning with the 
  17‘Buy it Now’ option. In addition, we must control for seller choices and characteristics, 
and also for the conduct of the auction itself.  For example, if the final price were affected 
by the excitement generated by the bidding process, then we would make incorrect 
inferences if we ignored the number of bids.  Consequently we report 2SLS results using 
instruments for the auction conduct variables—the duration,
5 the number of bids, the 
number of unique bidders, and whether the auction ended with ‘Buy it Now’—as well as 
for seller choices.  
Table 5 presents the 2SLS coefficient estimates for final price in the 722 auction 
sales. The first column presents results for all sales. Interestingly, the dummy variable 
indicating whether the auction started with the ‘Buy it Now’ option is statistically 
insignificant, so there is no obvious impatience effect in either direction. The second and 
third columns separate the cases in which the ‘Buy it Now’ option was not and was 
offered, and the last two columns separate the cases in which it was not or was accepted 
when offered. Units described as new command on average a significant $6.80 premium 
overall, and a marginally significant $16.74 premium when the ‘Buy it Now’ option was 
accepted. Units described as even slightly damaged go at a marginally significant $17.12 
discount overall, and a very significant $62.39 discount when the ‘Buy it Now’ option 
was accepted. Larger quantities in a single auction lead to a significant $4.18 average 
discount overall; as noted earlier, larger quantities are seldom offered in tandem with the 
‘Buy it Now’ option. Overall, the marginally significant time trend lowers price 21 cents 
per day on average, but it is insignificant in the sub-sample where the option was offered.  
 
                                                 
5 The variable indicating the duration of the auction was only endogenous in the ‘Buy it Now’ sub-samples, 
so it was instrumented there and not elsewhere. 
  18[Table 5 about here] 
Infrequent sellers obtain significantly lower prices (by about $10) than the 
Frequent sellers (dummy omitted) overall. The effect goes strongly the opposite way in 
the 91 auctions ending with an accepted ‘Buy it Now’ price. As explained in the 
Appendix, the reason is that almost all these sellers were actually using a posted price, so 
the higher realized price reflects a tradeoff against the lower probability of sale.  
Seller reputation as measured by NEGRATIO is insignificant overall, but has a 
large and significant impact in expected direction in the last sub-sample. The other 
reputation measure, LNSLRTNG measure is significantly and surprisingly negative 
overall, but is insignificant in the last sub-sample. The reputational measures both have 
multicollinearity problems, and the second measure is also closely related to seller 
experience. Hence reputation inferences are problematic in our data (and in other field 
data collected passively, as noted in our literature review in connection with Resnick et 
al., 2003).  
We conclude this section with several other observations on the results. 
Homepage links appear to raise price mainly in the last sub-sample. Other minor seller 
choices—secure payment, use of an image, buying a “featured” listing, and description 
length—all appear to have minor effects on the final price. Except in the last sub-sample, 
choosing a private reserve price appears to increase final sales price substantially. 
However, as noted in an earlier section, this does not imply that it increases seller 
revenue, because a private reserve price also reduces the probability of selling the item.
6 
The square of the starting price was included to allow for a non-linear relationship 
between the starting price and the final price, and the coefficient estimate indeed turns 
                                                 
6 A caveat is in order here: eBay sellers have one free resale-try when their auction is unsuccessful.  
  19out to be consistently positive and at least marginally significant.
7  In the case of all ‘Buy 
it Now’ auctions (column 3), the estimated effect on the final price of ending with the 
‘Buy it Now’ price being taken was significant and positive in our 2SLS results.
8  Using 
“Buy it Now” to effectively post a price appears to consistently have a positive impact on 
the final price (columns 3 – 5) but the impact is not significant.
9  Finally, the number of 
bids appears to push the price up slightly overall, and more so in the auctions that do not 
offer the ‘Buy it Now’ option. Of course, this effect is absent when the item is sold 




The fluid nature of e-commerce presents fertile ground for research into the 
influence of institutions on market performance.  Our work taps into the large body of 
data available on eBay seeking a better understanding of the connections between the 
two.  EBay’s increasingly diversified menu of options regarding market design provides a 
sample of transactions across a range of institutional structures.  Apart from the features 
within the second price auction structure such as duration, initial bid level, and private 
reserve price, alternatives exist allowing sellers to incorporate elements of the posted 
price institution to varying degrees.   The behavior of sellers operating in this market 
                                                 
7 In the ‘all sales’ regression, the starting price itself is significant and negative, but the economic impact is 
relatively small. 
8 This result contrasts with the ‘all sales’ regressions: however, this is probably indicative of differences in 
the factors driving the two types of auctions. 
9 The sub-sample where the ‘Buy it Now’ option was not accepted, appears to be an exception, since here it 
was marginally significant.  However, only one auction in this sub-sample of 121 auctions featured the 
seller using ‘Buy it Now’ to effectively post a price, so the conclusion stands. 
  20environment and the resulting outcomes yield some insight into this institution-
performance relationship. 
Sellers’ decisions regarding features such as initial bid levels and use of private 
reserve prices affect the conduct of the auction in dimensions relevant to the outcome.  
We found that auctions run by frequent sellers or featuring damaged items tended to have 
lower minimum bids.  This strategy generated more active auctions, which tend to 
increase final sales prices, ceteris paribus.  A private reserve price was less likely for new 
items and  frequent sellers, but more likely for sellers with home pages.   
The practice of offering items at a fixed, ‘Buy it Now’ price occurs widely across 
most product characteristics.  The existence of a ‘Buy it Now’ price did not have a 
significant impact on the sale price.  However, of the subsample with ‘Buy it Now’ 
prices, those where a buyer accepted ‘Buy it Now’ resulted in a higher sale price.   
Some sellers convert their auction into a take-it-or-leave-it posted price market by 
setting the initial bid equal to the ‘Buy it Now’ price.  Sellers with higher seller ratings 
and a higher frequency of selling in our sample were more likely to choose this posted 
price option.  New items were less likely to be offered at a posted price.  This practice 
allows a greater degree of control over the minimum price they receive, making it 
attractive to risk averse sellers.  Less patient sellers could also be utilizing a posted price 
to move their goods more quickly.  In practice, this choice appears to have no statistically 
significant impact on the sale price, though in some regressions the coefficient 
magnitudes are large ($20-$40).   
Clearly this is an area that offers many opportunities for further research.   
Possible extensions include broadening the sample to include multiple goods and 
investigating in greater depth the relationship between seller characteristics and market 
  21outcomes.  Field experiments that afford better control over seller-side characteristics 
could allow the exploration of ‘Buy it Now’ prices in other dimensions.  Further 
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  25Table 1: Sample and Sub-sample Means 
 
Variable All  Sales 
 “Buy it Now” 
not Offered 
“Buy it Now” 
Offered 
“Buy it Now” 
not Accepted 
“Buy it Now” 
Accepted 
Product Characteristics 
NEW  0.389 0.376 0.420 0.496 0.319 
DAMAGE  0.026 0.024 0.033 0.017 0.055 
EXTRAS  0.436 0.414 0.491 0.521 0.451 
QUANTITY  1.252  1.337 1.0471 1.083  1 
DAYS806 18 18 18 18 19 
Seller Characteristics 
SINGLSLR 0.440 0.465 0.382 0.413 0.341 
MULTSLR 0.298 0.278 0.344 0.273 0.440 
FREQSLR  0.262 0.257 0.274 0.314 0.220 
RETAILER 0.025 0.030 0.015 0.013 0.017 
NEGRATIO  3.538 3.214 4.319 4.110 4.597 
LNSLRTNG  0.440 0.465 0.382 0.413 0.341 
Seller Choices 
SLRHOME 0.129 0.106 0.184 0.182 0.187 
STARTPRC $79.97  $57.88 $133.10 $81.45 $201.78 
LOWSTPRC 0.395  0.455 0.25 0.438  0 
PRIVTRES 0.255 0.235 0.302 0.273 0.341 
FEATURED 0.026  0.037  0  0  0 
DSCLNGTH  4165 4266 3922 4144 3628 
IMAGE  0.713 0.661 0.840 0.860 0.813 
SCRPYDUM  0.722 0.692 0.792 0.810 0.769 
POSTDPRC 0.125  0  0.425  0.008  0.979 
STRTBYNW  0.294  0 1 1 1 
BYNOWPRC $217.16    $217.16  $227.97  $202.79 
Auction Outcomes 
DURATION  4.875 5.156 4.198 5.645 2.274 
ENDBYNOW 0.139    0.429  0  1 
NUMBIDS 15.878  18.910 8.585 13.198 2.451 
UNIQBIDR 9.026 10.669 5.075  7.537  1.802 
WINBID  $199.01 $197.96 $201.53 $201.35 $201.78 
Sample  Size  722 510 212 121  91 
 
  26Table 2: How Seller and Product Characteristics Influence Seller Choices: 
OLS Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variables  Independent  




‘Buy it Now’ 
Price 
1.50 -406  20.02***  NEW 
(0.226) -(1.309)  (3.877) 
-20.91 -31.00  -32.16**  DAMAGE 
-(1.119) -(0.037)  -(2.324) 
4.36 -334  3.59  EXTRAS 
(0.681) -(1.042)  (0.628) 
0.71 138  -11.10***  QUANTITY 
(0.273) (0.755)  -(2.857) 
-0.16 -7.00  0.15  DAYS806 
-(0.502) -(0.398)  (0.555) 
51.81*** -2835***  22.08***  SINGLSLR 
(6.817) -(8.062)  (3.425) 
59.77*** -1712***  10.39  MULTSLR 
(7.552) -(4.261)  (1.607) 
5.45 22830***  -453.25***  NEGRATIO 
(0.148) (6.921)  -(5.143) 
4.27** 234***  -2.64**  LNSLRTNG 
(2.319) (3.066)  -(2.040) 
Sample Size  722  722  212 
 
Note:  1 to 3 asterisks represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance, respectively 
 
 
  27Table 3: How Seller and Product Characteristics Influence Seller Choices: 
Logit Results 
 



















0.38* 0.21  -0.72***  0.45**  0.22 -0.28 -0.13  -1.99**  -0.86**  NEW 
(1.905) (1.107) -(3.280) (2.205) (1.036) -(0.931)  -(0.488)  -(2.291)  -(2.354) 
0.34 0.28 -0.33 0.53  1.61**  -1.15 0.23 -0.70 1.05  DAMAGE 
(0.634) (0.565) -(0.549) (0.909) (2.044) -(0.943) (0.299) -(0.537) (1.083) 
0.33*  -0.05 0.06 0.27 0.14 0.39  0.64**  0.29 -0.23  EXTRAS 
(1.771) -(0.315) (0.318) (1.466) (0.740) (1.318) (2.482) (0.582) -(0.713) 
-0.57***  0.01   -0.24***  -0.07  -0.08  0.02  0.19   QUANTITY 
-(3.284) (0.098)    -(3.345) -(0.829) -(0.696) (0.194)  (1.393)   
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.01  DAYS806 
(0.03)  -(1.248) -(0.702) -(0.574) (0.277)  (0.285) -(0.236) (1.337) -(0.324) 
-0.08 -1.38*** -0.31  -0.57**  -0.98***  1.28***  2.53*** 2.53**  0.19  SINGLSLR 
-(0.328) -(5.750) -(1.197) -(2.179) -(3.294) (3.238)  (6.202)  (2.174)  (0.419) 
0.39 -1.12***  -0.96*** -0.01 -0.91*** 0.39  1.46***  1.33  0.88*  MULTSLR 
(1.544) -(4.720) -(3.397) -(0.050) -(3.090) (1.022)  (3.708)  (1.139)  (1.880) 
-8.17*** -14.18***  -1.07  0.75  1.58  -5.68**  -7.45***  -44.79  1.45  NEGRATIO 
-(3.311) -(5.953) -(0.614) (0.449)  (0.916) -(2.270) -(3.064) -(1.541) (0.240) 
0.35*** 0.05 -0.22***  0.16***  0.37***  0.30*** 0.10 0.50***  0.32***  LNSLRTNG 
(6.563) (1.012) -(4.001) (2.941) (6.448) (3.455) (1.365) (3.490) (3.032) 
Sample  Size  722 722 722 722 722 510 510 510 212 
67.0  % correct 
predictions  69.9 68.8 74.0 71.3 73.3 
22.6 
% false 
negative  22.3 24.5 25.1  2.1  6.0 
% false 
positives  7.1 6.6    1.0  26.6  20.8 
See Table 4 
10.4 
 
Notes:  (1) Coefficients are reported, with t-statistics in parentheses. (2) 1 to 3 asterisks represent 10, 5, 1% 
significance, respectively.  (3) Seller choice of a 3-day auction is the omitted category for auction duration 
choices 
 
  28Table 4: Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Auction Length 
 
Predicted Length (days)  Actual 
Length  3 5  7 10  Total 
3 days  132 3  63  0  198 
5 days  37 7  54  0  98 
7 days  38 2 149 1 190 
10 days  2 1 20 1 24 
Total  209 13  286  2  510 
 
  29Table 5: 2SLS Regressions of Outcome (Value of Winning Bid) 
 
Variable  All Sales  No BuyNow  Only BuyNow BuyNow Rej.  BuyNow Acc.
7.700*** 7.429**  7.058**  3.201  16.744*  NEW 
(3.570)  (2.378) (2.288) (0.642) (1.922) 
-20.089** -20.510  -16.662  16.909 -62.391***  DAMAGE 
-(2.115)  -(1.448) -(1.304) (0.859)  -(3.291) 
2.722 6.092 2.379 -3.027 8.943  EXTRAS 
(1.053)  (1.614) (0.914) -(0.733) (0.911) 
-4.698*** -3.685***  -1.719  -5.071    QUANTITY 
-(3.930)  -(2.772) -(0.533) -(1.075)   
-0.165 -0.281* 0.069  0.125  0.168  DAYS806 
-(1.446)  -(1.865) (0.461) (0.500)  (0.482) 
-9.910*** -13.879***  8.744  -1.487  40.203***  SINGLSLR 
-(2.850)  -(2.968) (1.530) -(0.160) (2.701) 
-12.939*** -15.524***  2.474  -0.628  26.371*  MULTSLR 
-(3.696)  -(3.467) (0.479) -(0.063) (1.952) 
-40.864* -34.522  29.200 162.464*  -326.95**  NEGRATIO 
-(1.717)  -(1.260) (0.459) (1.691) -(2.398) 
-1.940*** -2.101**  -2.343**  -2.173  -1.240  LNSLRTNG 
-(3.307)  -(2.504) -(2.330) -(1.525) -(0.511) 
-2.404 -0.794  8.386** 7.399  29.557***  SLRHOME 
-(0.649)  -(0.134) (2.324) (0.978)  (3.516) 
-0.346*** -0.034  0.140  0.596*    STARTPRC 
-(2.823)  -(0.181) (0.716) (1.784)   
0.0026*** 0.0012*  0.0010*  0.000    SQRSTPRC 
(8.191)  (1.732) (1.864) -(0.122)   
-14.326* -2.589  14.694 36.070*    LOWSTPRC 
-(1.928)  -(0.253) (1.173) (1.783)   
12.210*** 11.147***  -1.205  16.975***  -14.774  PRIVTRES 
(4.963)  (2.994) -(0.346) (2.805) -(1.104) 
0.0009* 0.0012*  0.001  0.001  0.000  DSCLNGTH 
(1.807)  (1.782) (1.095) (1.607) (0.037) 
-1.454 -2.233 0.421  5.858 10.101  IMAGE 
-(0.402)  -(0.499) (0.129) (0.850)  (0.970) 
-4.719* -4.889  0.737  -2.771  13.136  SCRPYDUM 
-(1.754)  -(1.364) (0.205) -(0.450) (1.384) 
10.188 29.823        FEATURED 
(0.444)  (1.065)      
-2.718  6.949  20.751*  42.044  POSTDPRC 
-(0.635)   (1.072)  (1.668)  (1.474) 
2.417         STRTBYNW 
(0.882)      
   0.284***  0.290***    BYNOWPRC 
   (2.800)  (3.291)  
1.018* 1.082  2.132  3.871  2.628  (P)DURATION 
(1.932)  (1.429) (0.847) (1.288) (0.917) 
-14.310***   12.873**      PENDBYNW 
-(3.170)   (2.085)    
3.326** 3.997***  1.373*  1.791*  -0.523  PNUMBIDS 
(2.562)  (2.735) (1.704) (1.958) -(0.344) 
-3.769* -5.294** 4.436** 4.919** 11.408**  PNUMBDRS 
-(1.668)  -(2.047) (1.960) (2.137)  (2.206) 
R-Squared  0.2574 0.0188 0.6685 0.3295 0.2645 
Sample  Size  722 510 212 121  91 
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Dummy variable equal to one, if the item is definitively described to be “sealed, in the box, and new” in either 
the title of the auction listing or in the description text. 
DAMAGE 
Dummy variable equal to one, if any significant damage to the item is mentioned in either the title or the 
description text. 
EXTRAS 
Dummy variable equal to one, if the item is being offered with significant accessories, mentioned in either the 
title or the description text. 
QUANTITY  Number of items sold in a single, particular auction. 
DAYS806  Number of days between the start of the auction and the date of the first auction in the sample (8/6/01). 
SINGLSR  Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller only held one auction during our sample. 
MULTSLR 
Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller held more than one auction but no more than ten auctions during 
our sample. 
FREQSLR 
Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller held more than ten auctions but no more than fifty auctions during 
our sample. 
RETAILER  Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller held more than fifty auctions during our sample. 
LNSLRTNG 
This is the natural logarithm of the difference between the number of unique, positive comments about the 
seller and the number of unique, negative comments. 
NEGRATIO 
The ratio of the number of unique, negative comments to the total number of unique comments listed in the 
seller's feedback page. 
SLRHOME 
Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller posts a link to his website in the description text of the auction 
listing. 
STARTPRC  Initial price to start the bidding, posted by the seller at the beginning of the auction. 
SQRSTPRC  Square of the seller’s starting price. 
LOWSTPRC    Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller posts an initial price below twenty dollars. 
POSTDPRC  Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller sets the initial price equal to a displayed, ‘Buy it Now’ price. 
STRTBYNW 
Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller offers buyers the option to buy the item immediately at a displayed, 
‘Buy it Now’ price. 
BYNOWPRC  Seller's price if displayed at the beginning of the auction as a ‘Buy it Now’ offer. 
PRIVTRES 
Dummy variable equal to one, if the seller displays a notice that actual sale is subject to a buyer at least 
bidding as high as some unknown, private, reserve price. 
FEATURED 
Dummy variable set equal to one, if the seller paid extra to have the item(s) listed at the top of the listings, no 
matter what the potential buyer's search criteria was. 
DSCLNGTH 
Number of text characters in the description of the item, composed by the seller for the auction listing page, 
minus the number of HTML tags. 
IMAGE  Dummy variable set equal to one, if the seller included at least one image in the description of the item. 
SCRPYDUM  Dummy variable set equal to one, if the seller accepts credit cards, PayPal, or eBay Online Payments. 
DURATION  Duration of the auction, initially set by the seller to a maximum of 3, 5, 7, or 10 days. 
ENDBYNOW  Dummy variable equal to one, if the auction ends with a buyer accepting a seller's ‘Buy it Now’ option. 
NUMBIDS  Number of bids on the item(s) in a particular auction. 
UNIQBIDR  Number of unique bidders for the item(s) in a particular auction. 
WINBID  Dollar value of the final bid in an auction that resulted in a sale. 
 
 
  31OLS Regression Results 
Table A2 presents the OLS regression results for these auctions and bids.  The 
first three variables in each regression are characteristics of the item. The fourth variable 
indicates the quantity of items sold in a single auction. The fifth variable is the trend 
variable, controlling for relative time of entry into our sample period.  The next four 
variables capture seller characteristics and the subsequent twelve variables indicate seller 
choices, including the square of the starting price to control for some non-linearity 
component present in this seller choice. The final four variables are endogenous variables 
that capture various facets of the conduct of the auction. In particular, ENDBYNOW is a 
dummy variable capturing whether the auction ended with the acceptance of the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option or not.  The other variables capture the duration (endogenous in the case of 
‘Buy it Now’ auctions), the number of bids made, and the number of bidders.  
SRTBYNW is a critical variable, reflecting the decision whether to use the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option or not.  Note that when the ‘Buy it Now’ option is accepted, the ‘Buy it 
Now’ price is identical to the winning bid, the dependent variable in these regressions.  In 
order to appropriately control for such endogeneity in the entire sample and in each sub-
sample we have utilized 2SLS, as reported in the main text.   
In both our OLS and 2SLS results, it appears that non-frequent sellers tend to get 
lower prices for their items when there is no ‘Buy it Now’ option chosen by the seller, 
relative to frequent sellers (the omitted category of sellers selling 11-50 times in our 
sample).  This effect is significantly reversed when the seller makes the ‘Buy it Now’ 
option available and it is accepted by the buyer.  Again, all but one seller in this ‘Buy it 
Now’-accepted sub-sample is effectively posting a price, so one should look at a ‘no sale’ 
as the alternative to acceptance of the ‘Buy it Now’ option for this sub-sample.  Without 
  32considering the likelihood of ‘no sale’, it may initially appear as if a consequence of not 
posting a price is to end up selling the item for less, for inexperienced sellers in our 
sample. 
However, since the alternatives are different for buyers in the non-‘Buy it Now’ 
vs. “posted price” sub-samples it is interesting to more deeply consider the selling 
strategies of relatively inexperienced sellers in our sample. About 85% of all ‘no sales’ in 
our sample occurred for items being offered by inexperienced sellers, although none of 
these actually posted a price.  Additionally, about the same proportion of auctions that 
ended in no sale in our sample started with the ‘Buy it Now’ option as those that did end 
in a sale.  So, it appears that inexperienced sellers understood how to use the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option and only used it to effectively post a price when protecting their price in this 
way would probably not result in losing the sale.  Since this is a “take it or leave it” offer 
by the seller, this strategy can only boost the average final price in our regressions 
because no auction occurs, and the number of bids cannot be depressed.  
  33Table A2: OLS Regressions of Outcome (Value of Winning Bid) 
 
Variable All Sales No BuyNow Only BuyNow BuyNow Rej. BuyNow Acc.
      
NEW 8.869***  9.133***  6.005**  10.402***  13.847 
 (4.715)  (3.602)  (2.556)  (2.980)  (1.662) 
DAMAGE -25.081***  -27.274** -9.053*  4.215  -41.306*** 
 -(2.790)  -(2.014)  -(1.873)  (0.392)  -(3.439) 
EXTRAS 5.369***  9.606***  -0.191 -1.474  7.153 
 (2.703)  (2.927)  -(0.094)  -(0.475)  (0.761) 
QUANTITY -6.025*** -5.298***  -2.802  -4.690   
 -(6.066)  -(5.232)  -(1.070)  -(1.228)   
DAYS806 -0.150  -0.293**  0.019  0.135  0.005 
 -(1.442)  -(2.220)  (0.186)  (0.743)  (0.014) 
SINGLSLR -5.105**  -9.412***  3.919  7.082  36.485*** 
 -(2.066)  -(2.590)  (0.901)  (1.058)  (2.929) 
MULTSLR -9.561***  -13.055***  1.364  -0.382  32.297** 
  -(3.513) -(3.695) (0.337) -(0.058) (2.608) 
NEGRATIO -41.278**  -40.149*  -41.392  51.840  -442.377*** 
 -(2.001)  -(1.756)  -(0.904)  (0.721)  -(4.172) 
LNSLRTNG  -1.800***  -2.155*** -1.420** -3.717***  0.267 
 -(3.556)  -(3.061)  -(2.027)  -(3.197)  (0.167) 
SLRHOME  -1.105 -0.801 2.298 -0.358  27.965*** 
  -(0.326) -(0.143) (0.960) -(0.072) (3.340) 
STARTPRC -0.452***  -0.223  -0.288  -0.125   
 -(5.228)  -(1.510)  -(1.440)  -(0.427)   
SQRSTPRC 0.0029*** 0.0018*** 0.0019***  0.001   
 (12.203)  (3.027)  (3.026)  (1.399)   
LOWSTPRC -15.329**  -6.646  -1.824  7.547   
 -(2.384)  -(0.782)  -(0.130)  (0.411)   
PRIVTRES 10.744***  9.025***  2.339  5.839  -3.456 
 (5.003)  (2.816)  (0.926)  (1.040)  -(0.312) 
DSCLNGTH 0.0009*  0.0012*  0.000  0.001  0.000 
 (1.845)  (1.859)  (1.336)  (1.567)  (0.322) 
IMAGE 0.315  -0.275  0.430  1.106  12.695 
 (0.099)  -(0.069)  (0.175)  (0.252)  (1.281) 
SCRPYDUM -6.162**  -5.930* -2.961  -8.023  11.925 
 -(2.404)  -(1.773)  -(1.161)  -(1.642)  (1.382) 
FEATURED -6.696  -1.772       
 -(0.622)  -(0.152)       
POSTDPRC 4.249    18.045* 17.978* 38.865* 
 (1.091)    (1.898)  (1.955)  (1.764) 
STRTBYNW 0.482         
 (0.196)         
BYNOWPRC     0.337***  0.286***   
     (3.350) (2.764)   
ENDBYNOW  -23.322***   -14.337    
 -(5.515)    -(1.638)     
DURATION 0.320  0.615  0.041  -0.009  -0.727 
 (0.641)  (0.912)  (0.079)  -(0.012)  -(0.500) 
NUMBIDS 0.977***  1.058*** 0.959** 0.987**  0.577 
 (3.863)  (3.833)  (2.185)  (2.186)  (0.693) 
UNIQBIDR 0.001  -0.308  0.531  0.832  3.961* 
 (0.003)  -(0.612)  (0.619)  (0.863)  (1.678) 
R-Squared  0.3867  0.2532 0.8278 0.6797 0.3783 
Sample Size  722  510 212 121  91 
 
Notes: (1) 1 to 3 asterisks represent 10, 5, 1% significance, respectively.  (2) In the last sub-sample 
QUANTITY is omitted because it is always equal to 1 as is any variable calculated on the basis of the 
starting price, because the starting price is identical to the winning bid 
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However, from our analysis of conditional means (not reported) for the non-‘Buy 
it Now’ sub-sample, it appears that less experienced sellers started their auctions with 
prices that were over $41 higher, on average, than did more frequent sellers in the same 
sub-sample.  Also, this inexperienced group appears to have attracted about 9 less bids 
and 6 fewer bidders per auction than frequent sellers, within the same non-‘Buy it Now’ 
sub-sample.  Thus, inexperienced sellers may be dampening enthusiasm concerning their 
auctions by starting the bidding at a higher price than more experienced sellers in our 
sample, even without further reducing bidder interest by holding a private reserve auction 
or by utilizing the ‘Buy it Now’ option to effectively post a price which might be “too 
high”.  The regression analysis suggests that less-frequent sellers choose more often to 
start auctions at a higher starting price, which may be working by decreasing the 
excitement surrounding their auctions to cause their auctions to end with lower final bids, 
on average, in the non-‘Buy it Now’ sub-sample, as seen in the results in both Table A2 
and Table 5. 
For the OLS results in Table A2 and the 2SLS results in Table 5, LNSLRTNG has 
a negative, significant coefficient for the entire sample and for every sub-sample, except 
for where a ‘Buy it Now’ option was accepted.  An auction does not really occur for this 
last sub-sample and it appears that the seller’s rating did not significantly affect the level 
of the “posted price”, while the ratio of negative comments in a seller’s feedback listings 
appears to have had a significant, negative effect on this price, chosen by the seller.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients on NEGRATIO appear quite large due to the very small 
units of measurement for this variable.  For instance, the mean value of NEGRATIO in 
the ‘Buy it Now’-accepted sub-sample was 0.017.  Across the other two sub-samples, 
where a ‘Buy it Now’ option was not available, and where it was available but not 
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category, that is supporting a weak, negative correlation of LNSLRTNG with WINBID 
(Rho = -0.12 for the entire sample).  LNSLRTNG has a positive correlation with 
FREQSLR (Rho = 0.07), which in turn also has a weak, negative correlation with 
WINBID (Rho = -0.05).  Additionally, we are left with the possibility of bias affecting 
our results through one of the endogenous variables, which we examine with the 2SLS 
results for those variables.   
 
First-Stage Regression Results for 2SLS 
How exogenous characteristics and seller choices affect our regression results 
through the endogenous conduct of the auction may be explored further through our first-
stage regression results, which we present in Tables A3 and A4.  In Table A3, for the 
sample as a whole and for auctions where a ‘Buy it Now’ option was not made available, 
the characteristics of the goods have the expected impacts on the number of bids and 
bidders, and on whether a ‘Buy it Now’ option was accepted.   
Amongst seller characteristics the most interesting first-stage results are that the 
proportion of negative comments in the seller’s rating appears to have a significant 
positive impact on both the number of bids and the number of unique bidders for the 
sample as a whole, and for the sub-sample where the ‘Buy it Now’ option was not 
available.  At the same time, the log of the seller rating was insignificant.  This is 
consistent with our earlier suggestion that negative comments appear to be effectively 
hidden on the separate seller ratings page, or swamped by positive comments for more 
frequent sellers/buyers, or are so strongly correlated with the sellers’ ratings (experience) 
that it can appear to have a significant, positive impact on the final price in our final 
regressions and with the number of bids and bidders in these first-stage regressions. 
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suggestion of the likely decrease in enthusiasm from bidders if the seller chooses a high 
starting price or chooses a private reserve price.  Both of these choices appear to have a 
significant, negative impact on the number of bids and of bidders for our sample as a 
whole as well as for the non-‘Buy it Now’ sub-sample.  We have argued that such 
choices appear to mostly occur among the relatively inexperienced sellers in our sample.  
Additionally, the choice to pay eBay an additional fee to feature an item, though 
undertaken by almost no sellers in our sample, does appear to have had a significant, 
positive impact in attracting both more bids and bidders. 
With respect to our focus on the ‘Buy it Now’ institution, the most interesting 
result is significant negative impact of the seller’s choice to make the ‘Buy it Now’ 
option available, on the number of bids.  This choice also has a large, negative impact on 
the number of bidders but this result is statistically insignificant.  Also, as we have 
mentioned, almost no ‘Buy it Now’ option was accepted unless the seller chose to use 
”Buy it Now” to effectively post a price.  This characteristic of the auctions in our sample 
is again reflected in Table A3 by the strong, significantly positive coefficient on posting a 
price, for the endogenous outcome of the auction ending with the ‘Buy it Now’ option 
being accepted. 
One should note from Table A4 that the duration of the auction is an additional 
endogenous variable in all auctions where the seller made a ‘Buy it Now’ option 
available.  We expect chosen duration to be impacted in a similar manner by the product 
characteristics, seller characteristics, and seller choices, as are the other conduct 
variables, and this generally appears to be the case.  New items enjoy significantly less 
time at auction before being purchased, on average, while damaged items spend relatively 
more time being bid upon.  It appears more likely (Table A3) that a first bidder will cut 
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likely that a first bidder will do so for a damaged item.  Product characteristics are not as 
significant in explaining the duration of the auction for the sub-sample where the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option is not accepted, because auction duration reverts to whatever was initially 
chosen by the seller. 
Selling frequencies are important seller characteristics that appear to significantly 
impact the auction duration.  Both single sellers and slightly more experienced sellers 
appeared to have had significantly shorter auctions than more frequent sellers (the 
omitted category), whether their ‘Buy it Now’ price was accepted or not.  In addition, 
there appear to be significant, negative impacts on the number of bidders and on the 
number of bids from being a less frequent seller for the sub-sample where the ‘Buy it 
Now’ option was accepted by the first bidder.  However, this result is solely due to one 
auction in our sample with a buyer that “trembled” and bid above the ‘Buy it Now’ price.  
Since the ‘Buy it Now’ price did not disappear in this case, it appears that another bidder 
then was able to actually underbid the first bidder and still win the item, according to 
eBay’s rules for “Buy it Now”.  The seller for this particular auction appears to have been 
a more frequent seller but with a relatively high ratio of negative comments in his or her 
seller rating. 
Clearly, if it were not for this one auction in our sample, we would expect the 
only significant endogenous impacts to occur on the auction duration and not on the 
number of bids or bidders in the sub-sample where the ‘Buy it Now’ option was accepted.  
The only other significant impacts on auction duration in this sub-sample are when the 
seller choosing to provide a link to his/her homepage, has a significant negative impact 
on the duration of the auction, and providing a photograph of the item, has an unexpected 
positive impact on auction duration (but is only marginally significant). 
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the first bidder, most of the significant, impacts on endogenous variables appear to be on 
the number of bids, and not on the auction duration or the number of unique bidders, 
where the lack of impact on the auction duration is understandable, since duration reverts 
to the seller’s initial choice.  For this sub-sample, Table A9 presents results that indicate 
experience may have differing significant impacts on the duration of the auction vs. the 
number of bids or bidders.  That is, less-experienced sellers appear to have set auction 
durations that were significantly shorter, yet attracted both significantly more bids and 
bidders, on average, than more frequent sellers in our sample. 
Additionally, it again appears that lower starting prices can increase the 
participation in the auction, in terms of the number of bids, in this sub-sample where the 
‘Buy it Now’ option was not accepted.  Also, selling a greater quantity of Palm Pilot Vx’s 
in a single auction tended to significantly decrease both the number of bids and bidders, 
while new items attracted significantly more bids and bidders in our sample. 
  While some of the coefficients in the non-‘Buy it Now’ regressions and the 
regressions that began with a ‘Buy it Now’ option but then proceeded as a regular auction 
are quite dissimilar, there are other similarities, and we therefore tested for a structural 
break using a likelihood ratio test.  The results for both the OLS and 2SLS regressions 
indicate that the null hypothesis of no structural break could not be rejected.  This would 
suggest that starting an auction with the ‘Buy it Now’ option may not have significant 
impacts on the outcome if the ‘Buy it Now’ option does not get invoked.  On the other 
hand, the auctions that end with the ‘Buy it Now’ option seem to behave quite differently, 
as we have discussed. 
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All Auctions No “Buy it Now” Option
Variable  Num. of  Num. Bidders End BuyNow Num. of Bids Num. Bidders
NEW  1.365**  0.413 -0.376 1.060  0.257 
 (2.233)  (1.429)  -(0.455)  (1.287)  (0.639) 
DAMAGE -3.593** -0.543  -0.221  -3.737**  -0.916 
 -(2.267)  -(0.659)  -(0.079)  -(2.273)  -(1.385) 
EXTRAS 0.168  -0.517**  -0.602  0.138  -0.582* 
 (0.312)  -(2.047)  -(0.791)  (0.190)  -(1.701) 
QUANTITY -8.980*** -4.713***    -9.221***  -5.065*** 
 -(3.670)  -(3.462)    -(3.482)  -(3.455) 
DAYS806 0.072 0.716  0.127***  -3.963 -0.369 
 (0.014)  (0.278)  (2.576)  -(0.601)  -(0.101) 
SINGLSLR 6.462**  2.610  1.353  6.569  1.818 
  (2.017)  (1.562) (0.725) (1.414) (0.712) 
MULTSLR 6.200  2.088  0.241  1.961  -0.814 
  (1.487)  (0.950) (0.138) (0.333) -(0.243) 
NEGRATIO  73.522***  28.060*** -17.641 90.722***  38.886*** 
 (3.767)  (3.289)  -(1.025)  (3.949)  (3.754) 
LNSLRTNG -0.844  -0.347  0.411  -1.260*  -0.595 
  -(1.352)  -(1.097) (1.520) -(1.751) -(1.524) 
SLRHOME -0.353  -0.350  0.698  -0.062  0.276 
  -(0.345)  -(0.653) (0.613) -(0.036) (0.283) 
STARTPRC -0.649*** -0.452***  0.092*  -0.740**  -0.347** 
  -(3.102)  -(4.891) (1.646) -(2.229) -(2.105) 
SQRSTPRC 0.0009***  0.0005***  -0.0002  0.0009**  0.0003 
 (3.601)  (4.893)  -(0.981)  (2.024)  (1.363) 
LOWSTPRC 3.401  3.140***    4.745  2.887** 
 (1.178)  (2.717)    (1.393)  (1.963) 
PRIVTRES -2.051***  -0.774***  1.580  -2.316*** -0.897*** 
  -(3.535)  -(2.884) (1.497) -(3.213) -(2.634) 
DSCLNGTH 0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.0002  -0.0004 
 (0.359)  -(0.905)  -(0.683)  (0.251)  -(0.876) 
IMAGE -0.493  -0.802**  0.640  -2.087**  -1.505*** 
  -(0.641)  -(2.217) (0.721) -(2.021) -(2.926) 
SCRPYDUM -0.268  0.0614  -0.011  0.271  0.262 
 -(0.356)  (0.165)  -(0.013)  (0.293)  (0.557) 
FEATURED 57.538*** 39.781***    58.40***  40.873*** 
 (8.883)  (10.437)    (8.348)  (10.146) 
DURATION -0.807  -0.608    -2.180  -1.586 
 -(0.383)  -(0.582)    -(0.834)  -(1.216) 
STRTBYNW -375.06 -405.08***  7.84     
 -(0.975)  -(2.670)  (1.266)     
BYNOWPRC 0.230  0.367  -0.044     
 (0.364)  (1.460)  -(1.514)     
POSTDPRC 0.412  -0.012 8.873***     
 (0.277)  -(0.015)  (4.182)     
PENDBYNW -0.309  0.035       
 -(0.221)  (0.045)       
R Squared   0.7672  0.8353  0.7629 0.8377 
Log-Likelihood   -32.846    
Sample  Size  722  722 722 510 510 
 
Notes: (1) Coefficients are reported with t-statistics below in parentheses. (2) 1 to 3 asterisks represent 10, 
5, 1% significance, respectively.  (3) The results for the number of bids and bidders are from OLS first-
stage regressions.  The results for accepting “Buy it Now” are from a Logit regression
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Table A4: First Stage Regressions for Instrumenting Conduct Variables 
(continued) 
 














NEW -1.321***  -0.888  -0.592  0.499  3.083**  0.996** 
 -(2.666)  -(1.278)  -(1.657)  (1.193)  (2.571)  (2.070) 
DAMAGE 2.238***  4.019**  1.794 -0.935 -3.897 -0.559 
 (2.723)  (2.135)  (1.174)  -(0.902)  -(1.075)  -(0.285) 
EXTRAS -0.051  -0.540  -0.625  0.809  -0.528  -0.276 
 -(0.074)  -(0.609)  -(1.337)  (1.313)  -(0.424)  -(0.514) 
QUANTITY       3.271  -14.117*  -12.919*** 
       (1.197)  -(1.707)  -(3.707) 
DAYS806  -2.866 0.555 0.464 -6.206  18.994  24.525*** 
  -(0.872) (0.151) (0.238) -(1.120) (1.032)  (3.285) 
SINGLSLR -15.989***  -39.774*** -12.165** -6.742*** 9.823  7.587** 
 -(3.014)  -(3.676)  -(2.566)  -(2.901)  (1.225)  (2.354) 
MULTSLR -15.023***  -34.905*** -7.713*  -10.633*** 37.179***  17.281*** 
 -(3.425)  -(3.347)  -(1.809)  -(3.018)  (3.899)  (4.241) 
NEGRATIO -4.483  189.636*** 69.766*** -39.903  45.184  -34.150 
  -(0.178) (4.293) (3.634) -(0.949) (0.373) -(0.803) 
LNSLRTNG -0.825 -1.282 -0.018 -0.024 -0.795  0.305 
  -(1.201) -(1.156) -(0.036) -(0.028) -(0.503)  (0.372) 
SLRHOME -1.537**  -0.694  -0.569  -0.486  1.549  -1.107 
 -(2.021)  -(0.554)  -(0.831)  -(0.727)  (0.673)  -(1.031) 
STARTPRC      -0.189  -0.907  -0.715** 
       -(0.726)  -(1.323)  -(2.202) 
SQRSTPRC      0.000  0.0013*  0.001*** 
       (0.986)  (1.732)  (2.872) 
LOWSTPRC       -1.150  4.257  0.519 
       -(0.276)  (0.336)  (0.094) 
PRIVTRES 0.142  3.905***  1.976***  -0.348  -2.570  -1.356* 
 (0.295)  (5.686)  (5.854)  -(0.564)  -(1.327)  -(1.676) 
DSCLNGTH -0.0002 -0.0007  0.0008  0.0004  0.0013  -0.0003 
  -0.131 -(0.359) (0.584) (0.573) (0.710) -(0.305) 
IMAGE 1.085*  -0.091  0.395  -0.490  3.840*  0.787 
  (1.790) -(0.091) (0.866) -(0.589) (1.781)  (1.031) 
SCRPYDUM 0.366  -1.177 -0.849* -0.497  -2.028  0.004 
  (0.653) -(1.389) -(1.777) -(1.060) -(1.304)  (0.007) 
BYNOWPRC       0.140  -0.333  0.036 
       (0.415)  -(0.272)  (0.091) 
POSTDPRC 1.131 -1.200 -0.385 -2.150 2.442  0.142 
 (0.533)  -(0.855)  -(0.415)  -(1.281)  (0.499)  (0.068) 
R Squared   0.3542  0.7178  0.6766  0.4183  0.6884  0.7116 
Sample Size  91  91  91  121  121  121 
 
Notes: See Table A3 